Introduction to Internet Mail

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Mail agents

- MUA = Mail User Agent
- Interacts directly with the end user Pine, MH, Elm, mutt, mail, Eudora, Mulberry, Pegasus, Netscape, Outlook, ...
- Multiple MUAs on one system end user choice
- MTA = Mail Transfer Agent
- Receives and delivers messages Sendmail, Smail, MMDF, Charon, Exim, qmail, Postfix, ...
- One MTA per system sysadmin choice
- Most MTAs can also act as Mail Submission Agents (MSAs)

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
Message format (1)

```
From: Philip Hazel <ph10@cus.cam.ac.uk>
To: Julius Caesar <julius@ancient-rome.net>
Cc: Mark Anthony <MarkA@cleo.co.uk>
Subject: How Internet mail works
Julius,
   I'm going to be running a course on ...
```

- Format was defined by RFC 822 in 1982
- Now superseded by RFC 2822 (published 2001)
- Message consists of
 Header lines some have a well-defined syntax
 A blank line terminates the end of the header
 Body lines
- Notice that a message is defined in terms of lines


Message format (2)

• An email address consists of a *local part* and a *domain*



- A basic message body is unstructured ASCII text
- Other RFCs (MIME, 2045) add additional header lines that define structure for the body
- MIME supports attachments of various kinds and in various encodings
- Creating/decoding attachments is really the MUA's job MTAs may have to do it to interface to content scanners

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Authenticating senders

- Embedded MUA uses inter-process call to send to MTA May use pipe, file, or internal SMTP over a pipe MTA know the identity of the sender Normally inserts *Sender:* header if it differs from *From:*
- Freestanding MUA uses SMTP to send mail
 MTA cannot easily distinguish local/remote clients
 No authentication in basic SMTP protocol
 AUTH command in extended SMTP
 Use of security additions (TLS/SSL)
 MUA can point at any MTA whatsoever
 Need for relay control
 Host and network blocks

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A message in transit (1)

• Headers added by the MUA before sending

```
From: Philip Hazel <ph10@cus.cam.ac.uk>
To: Julius Caesar <julius@ancient-rome.net>
Cc: Mark Anthony <MarkA@cleo.co.uk>
Subject: How Internet mail works

Date: Mon, 10 May 2004 11:29:24 +0100 (BST)
Message-ID: <Pine.SOL.3.96.990117111343.
    19032A-100000@taurus.cus.cam.ac.uk>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII

Julius,
    I'm going to be running a course on ...
```

A message in transit (2)

Headers added by MTAs

```
Received: from taurus.cus.cam.ac.uk

([192.168.34.54] ident=exim)

by mauve.csi.cam.ac.uk with esmtp

(Exim 4.30) id 101qxX-00011X-Ab;

Mon, 10 May 2004 11:50:39 +0100

Received: from ph10 (helo=localhost)

by taurus.cus.cam.ac.uk with local-smtp

(Exim 4.31) id 101qin-0005PB-2c;

Mon, 10 May 2004 11:50:25 +0100

From: Philip Hazel <ph10@cus.cam.ac.uk>
To: Julius Caesar <julius@ancient-rome.net>
Cc: Mark Anthony <MarkA@cleo.co.uk>
Subject: How Internet mail works
Date: Mon, 10 May 2004 11:29:24 +0100 (BST)

...
```

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A message in transit (3)

• A message is transmitted with an *envelope*:

```
MAIL FROM:<ph10@cus.cam.ac.uk>
RCPT TO:<julius@ancient-rome.net>
```

- The envelope is separate from the RFC 2822 message
- Envelope (RFC 2821) fields need not be the same as the header (RFC 2822) fields (**From:** and **To:**)
- MTAs are (mainly) concerned with envelopes Just like the Post Office...
- Error ("bounce") messages have null senders

 MAIL FROM:<>
- This is to prevent looping

An SMTP session (1)

```
telnet relay.ancient-rome.net 25

220 relay.ancient-rome.net ESMTP Exim ...

EHLO taurus.cus.cam.ac.uk

250-relay.ancient-rome.net ...

250-SIZE 10485760

250-PIPELINING

250 HELP

MAIL FROM:<ph10@cus.cam.ac.uk>

250 OK

RCPT TO:<julius@ancient-rome.net>

250 Accepted

DATA

354 Enter message, ending with "."

Received: from ...

(continued on next slide)
```

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An SMTP session (2)

```
From: ...
To: ...
etc...

250 OK id=10sPdr-00034H-4B
QUIT
221 relay.ancient-rome.net closing connec...
```

SMTP return codes

2xx OK 3xx send more data 4xx temporary failure 5xx permanent failure

Email forgery

- It is trivial to forge unencrypted, unsigned mail
- This is an inevitable consequence when the sender and recipient hosts are independent
- Most SPAM contains forged senders and forged header lines
- Be alert for forgery when investigating
- and ...
- ➤ Never send automatic SPAM or virus warnings! ◀
- If you do, you are just adding to the problem
 This is known as "collateral spam" or "Joe jobs"

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The Domain Name Service

- The DNS is a worldwide, distributed database
- DNS servers are called *name servers*
- There are multiple servers for each DNS zone
- Secondary servers are preferably off-site
- Records in the DNS are keyed by type and domain name
- Root servers are at the base of the hierarchy
- Caching is used to improve performance
- Each record has a time-to-live field

Use of the DNS for email (1)

- Three DNS record types are used for routing mail
- *Mail eXchange* (MX) records map mail domains to host names, and provide a list of hosts, with preferences

```
hermes.cam.ac.uk. MX 5 green.csi.cam.ac.uk.
MX 7 ppsw3.csi.cam.ac.uk.
MX 7 ppsw4.csi.cam.ac.uk.
```

• Address (A) records map host names to IPv4 addresses

```
green.csi.cam.ac.uk. A 131.111.8.57
ppsw3.csi.cam.ac.uk. A 131.111.8.38
ppsw4.csi.cam.ac.uk. A 131.111.8.44
```

• IPv6 addresses use AAAA ("quad A") records

```
ahost.csi.cam.ac.uk. AAAA 2001:630:200:...
```

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Use of the DNS for email (2)

- MX records were added to the DNS after its initial deployment
- Backwards compatibility rule

 If no MX records found, look for an address record, and if found, treat as an MX with 0 preference
- MX records were invented for gateways to other mail systems, but are now heavily used for handing generic (e.g. corporate) mail domains
- SRV (service) records can also be used for email routing This feature is not widely deployed

Other DNS records

- The PTR record type maps IP addresses to names
- The IP address is inverted, then looked up in in-addr.arpa

```
57.8.111.131.in-addr.arpa. PTR green.csi.cam.ac.uk.
```

PTR and address records do not have to be one-to-one

```
ppsw4.csi.cam.ac.uk. A 131.111.8.33
33.8.111.131.in-addr.arpa.
   PTR lilac.csi.cam.ac.uk.
```

CNAME records provide a general aliasing facility

```
pelican.cam.ac.uk.
  CNAME redshank.csx.cam.ac.uk.
```

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DNS lookup tools

• host is easy to use for simple queries

```
host demon.net
host 192.168.34.135
host -t mx demon.net
```

• *nslookup* is more widely available, but is more verbose in both input and output

```
nslookup bt.net
nslookup 192.168.34.135
nslookup -querytype=mx bt.net
```

• dig is the ultimate nitty-gritty tool

```
dig bt.net
dig -x 192.168.34.135
dig energis.net mx
```

DNS mysteries

- Sometime primary and secondary name servers get out of step
- When mystified, check for server disagreement
 A second argument for host specifies a name server

```
host -t ns xxx.ac.uk

xxx.ac.uk NS mentor.xxx.ac.uk

xxx.ac.uk NS ns0.ja.net

host hermes.xxx.ac.uk mentor.xxx.ac.uk

hermes.xxx.ac.uk A 192.168.1.3

host hermes.xxx.ac.uk ns0.ja.net

hermes.xxx.ac.uk has no A record at

ns0.ja.net (Authoritative answer)
```

Common DNS errors

- Final dots missing on RHS host names in MX records
- MX records point to aliases instead of canonical names
 This should work, but is inefficient and deprecated
- MX records point to non-existent hosts
- MX records contain IP addresses instead of host names on the right-hand side

Unfortunately some MTAs accept this Also, some name server software conspires to support this

- MX records do not contain a preference value
- Some broken name servers give a server error when asked for a non-existent MX, AAAA, or SRV record

Routing a message

- Process locally handled addresses
 Alias lists
 Forwarding files
 Local mailboxes
- Recognize special remote addresses
 For example, those for local client hosts
- Look up MX records for remote addresses
- If self in the list, ignore all MX records with preferences greater than or equal to own preference

 This logic is for secondary MX servers
- For each remaining MX record, get the host's IP address(es)

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Delivering a message

- Perform local delivery
- For each remote delivery

 Try to connect to each remote host until one succeeds

 If it accepts or permanently rejects the message, that's it
- After temporary failures, try again at a later time
- Time out after deferring too many times
- Addresses are often sorted to avoid sending multiple copies of the same message

The RFCs recommend single copies with multiple recipients Sometimes single copies are necessary

Checking incoming senders

- A lot of messages are sent with bad envelope senders
 Misconfigured mail software
 Unregistered domains
 Misconfigured name servers
 Forgeries probably now the biggest cause nowadays
- Many MTAs check the domain of the sender address
- It is harder to check the local part
 A reverse SMTP "callout" is needed
 Uses more resources and can be quite slow
- Bounce messages have no envelope sender; no check is possible

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Checking incoming recipients

Some MTAs check each local recipient during the SMTP transaction

Errors are handled by the *sending* MTA The receiving MTA avoids problems with bad senders

 Other MTAs accept messages without checking, and look at the recipients later

Errors are handled by the receiving MTA

More detailed error messages can be generated ...

- ... but not necessarily delivered
- ... or delivered to an innocent 3rd party (collateral spam)
- The current proliferation of forged senders has made the first approach much more popular nowadays

Reduces collateral spam (ratware does not generate bounces)

Relay control

- Incoming: From any host to specific domains Example: incoming gateway or backup MTA
- Outgoing: From specific hosts to anywhere Example: outgoing gateway on local network
- From SMTP-authenticated hosts to anywhere Example: travelling employee or ISP customer connected to a remote network
- Encryption can be used for password protection during authentication
- Authentication can also be done using certificates
- Any other relaying is "open", and is a Bad Thing

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Policy controls on incoming mail

- Block known miscreant hosts and networks Spamhaus project, Realtime Blackhole List (RBL), Dial-up list (DUL), and many more
- Block known miscreant senders Not as effective as it once was
- Reject SMTP protocol violations Catches some "pump and dump" ratware
- Greylisting temporarily reject unknown senders
- Refuse malformed messages
- Refuse virus-laden messages
- Recognize SPAM Discard

Annotate

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